

# **M/V NORTHERN VIGOR**

**REPORT OF** April 21, 2014

**SUBMITTED BY:** Capt. R. W. Johnson

**SUBJECT:** Pilot Injury on Boarding  
About 6.5 miles NW of the CR Buoy

**PILOT:** Capt. Dan Jordan

**HELICOPTER CREW:** Pilot – Roy Wilkowski Copilot – Scott Firth  
Winchman – Frank O'Donnell

## **VESSEL PARTICULARS:**

**LOA:** 727.2'

**BREADTH:** 97.7'

**DRAFT:** FWD: 28'-10"

AFT: 33'-10"

**GRT:** 27,437

**REGISTRATION:** German

**CLASSIFICATION:** Germanischer Lloyd

**CREW:** Romanian Master, Officers and crew of various nationalities

## **ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS:**

Night Good visibility in passing rain showers SW wind 11-16 Kts  
Temperature 50° Significant wave: 7.5' at 10.3 seconds

## **DISCUSSION OF EVENTS:**

Capt. Jordan was transferring from the *Aliki P*, an outbound bulk carrier, over to the *Northern Vigor*, an inbound container vessel at about 2300 on the evening of April 4<sup>th</sup> when the incident occurred. He was using the helicopter for this transition, a normal operation for the Bar Pilots that expedites the transfer and increases the safety and efficiency on the pilot grounds. He called for the helicopter about 2250 and it took him off the *Aliki P* at 2305. They then flew about 6 miles to the *Northern Vigor*. Approaching the *Northern Vigor*, the wind was from the SW at about 15 knots and the ship was riding easily with a small roll and pitch. She was on a course of 150° making 17 knots, giving a relative wind on the starboard bow of about 32 knots. She was kept on this course and speed as turning into the wind more, to starboard, would have induced a roll.

Boarding container ships requires an open space on the hatch covers, as they may be covered with containers. On approach, the helicopter flew down the *Northern Vigor's* starboard side and it was seen that the deck was nearly full, with most areas covered by containers two high. The helo looked at going to the wing of the bridge, often an option on loaded container ships, but there were too many obstructions for using this location. There was one place near midships where it was clear down to the hatch cover, but this was close to the middle of the stow and experience has shown that lowering down into such a restricted space risks the hoist wire getting tangled with an obstruction. The next best place was well forward where there were a few containers on the port side but then it was clear on the hatch cover the rest of the way across the ship. The normal practice is to work further aft and on the port side. This location was discussed by the command structure on the helicopter (the pilot, copilot, winchman and bar pilot) all of whom felt that this location was safe to work.

The helicopter was moved into location over the open hatch and the hoist begun. The helicopter was in a hover 20-25' above the deck, canted a little to the right of the ship's heading so as to be headed into the wind. The helicopter pilot was using the containers forward of the open space as his reference point while the winchman conned him into position over the desired spot, after which the helicopter pilot held her in a stationary hover. The bar pilot was lowered in a normal hoist with no excessive swinging down to the hatch cover. He was on deck, as the wire went slack, and in the instant it took to release the hook the helicopter pilot lost reference and started to fall back relative to the ship. The winch operator felt the wire go slack and then had it take tension again, but could no longer see the pilot. He paid out wire as fast as possible. When he could not pay out fast enough to put slack in the wire he made the decision to fire the cutter, releasing about 80' of wire to fall to the ship (see pictures).

The bar pilot remembered the winching going normally down to the hatch cover. As he was pressing the bale lock buttons for the hook to release he was jerked backwards and raised off the hatch then fell back to the hatch. The next thing he remembered was realizing that he was lying on the hatch cover in a pile of container lashings. Recovering, he found his shoulder hurt but he seemed to be alright, which he reported to the helicopter on his portable radio.

As the helicopter pilot regained his reference and moved forward he heard the winchman report that he had cut the wire. He flew forward, then out away from the ship. As they passed over the open bay the bar pilot was seen near the after edge of the bay. When they were clear of the ship and in safe forward flight the pilot instructed the ship to send a medical team forward, that the pilot may have been hurt. Capt. Jordan, responded on his handheld radio that he had hurt his back but was going to head back to the ship's wheel house. The helicopter circled the ship and by the time they got back over the forward area where the pilot had been lowered he had left the hatch cover and was under the containers working his way aft.

After the communications with the bar pilot by radio the helicopter continued back to the Astoria airport. There were no mechanical issues with the aircraft during the flight. When



on the ground, the helicopter pilot called the bar pilot by cell phone to check on his condition, then followed their procedures to report the incident internally, take the helo out of service and debrief.

When the bar pilot got up to the bridge of the ship his shoulder hurt but he felt in control and after discussing his condition with the ship's Master decided to continue piloting the ship on in. Capt. Jordan called the operations bar pilot ashore to inform him that he had been hurt and advise him of his intention to pilot the ship into Astoria. Part way into Astoria, Capt. Jordan realized that his shoulder injury was more serious than he first thought. At this point he called ahead to the inside pilot launch, Conner Foss, and informed them that he would be staying onboard the ship as he could not safely climb down the pilot ladder. He also asked if the river pilot could come aboard a little early as the pain was mounting. The river pilot, Capt. Al Sheridan, entered the 14<sup>th</sup> Street office and was told by the dispatcher that the bar pilot had been hurt boarding and had requested to be relieved in Young's Bay. His immediate response was "let's go" and they met the ship as she crossed the bay. Capt. Jordan turned over the con to Capt. Sheridan but stayed on the bridge until off Astoria, as this part of the channel is not normally transited by river pilots. Capt. Jordan went below with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Mate, had his arm strapped to his chest and was given an anti-inflammatory similar to ibuprofen. On reaching Portland, at about 0800 both pilots left the ship and Capt. Jordan's wife, who had been called earlier, took him to the hospital for treatment.

The pilot boat operator in Hammond was doing flight following (formalized radio communications between the helicopter and shore to monitor the flight's progress) and heard the communications between the helicopter, ship and pilot, so knew there had been a problem. He immediately had the boat prepared to go to sea, then waited for further instructions. Both the boat crew in Hammond and the dispatcher at 14<sup>th</sup> Street heard the radio communications but did not make any radio calls in order to keep the airways clear. They did establish phone contact between themselves and stayed on the phone until it was clear that they were not needed.

#### **INCIDENT ANALYSIS:**

The decision to use the helicopter for boarding this vessel was normal. Container ships are regularly boarded by helicopter. The fact that they are fast vessels and often on tight schedules allows them to take full advantage of the helicopter's speed. This ship's relatively light draft indicated that she was not fully loaded, so the assumption that there would be a suitable location to lower a pilot was a normal one. The weather was not an issue, making helicopter boarding preferable.

On approaching the ship and finding the hatch covers mostly covered by containers would not have been as expected, but a condition seen many times before. Elimination of going to the bridge wing would also have been obvious. A bridge wing hoist requires all conditions to be close to perfect and the obstruction of the compass binnacle and the fact that

the radar mast was a bit aft of the pilot's sight range would have been enough to make this too risky. Moving forward, the opening in the middle of the stow was eliminated by Capt. Jordan. Going down into a hole surrounded by containers two high is too exacting to be safe. The space well forward provided room for the hoist but only gave the helicopter pilot limited visual references to use in hovering. There was discussion approaching the area and all members of the flight crew agreed that this location was the best and could be safely worked.

#### **LESSONS LEARNED:**

1. The helicopter pilot will in the future tell the ship's Captain to have his crew standby in the general location where we expect to make the hoist.
2. Capt. Jordan found paint from the deck on his helmet and coat. There was no sign of head trauma, but clearly he hit something and proves the value of a helmet and will be required equipment during hoists.
3. This incident shows the importance of maintaining close communications between the bar pilot and the helicopter. That Capt. Jordan was able to tell the helicopter that he was alright allowed them to focus their attention on flying the aircraft back to Astoria.
4. Every effort needs to be followed to have communications with the ship while she is still well at sea establishing that there is a safe place to lower the pilot. The container companies have been requested to send a copy of the stow plan to the Bar Pilots prior to ship arrivals to assist in this decision making. If there is a question, the boat needs to be used to board the vessel.

#### **REDOMMENDATIONS:**

There was no error on the part of the bar pilot.

**Respectfully Submitted:**

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to be "Robert W. Johnson", is written over a black rectangular redaction box.

**Capt. Robert W. Johnson**



## M/V NORTHERN VIGOR



This picture shows what the clear hatch at # 2 would have looked like. This is not the actual stow at the time of the incident.





The helicopter SEAHAWK with winch mounted on right side. The cutter is located inside the winch housing.



Winch controller. The cutter door with the button under is on left.



The wire from the hook to where it was cut and a close up of the cut end.

## **Supporting Documents**

- 1. Columbia River Bar Pilots dispatch sheet**
- 2. USCG Vessel Particulars**
- 3. Weather from NOAA buoy Station 46029**
- 4. Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots Report of Marine Incident**
- 5. Statement of Facts, Master of *NORTHERN VIGOR***

**INBOUND**  
**04/04/2014**

ound traffic scheduled for 04 Apr (No Ship)

(UNKNOWN) BAR 2359

**04/05/2014**

|  |                  |            |                        |
|--|------------------|------------|------------------------|
| orthern Vigour 727' (N-L) 33' 10"                              | VANCOUVER (BC)   | (604)      | BAR 0000 SW            |
| Copacabana 583' (TM) 21' 0"                                    | HONOLULU         | (AST ANC)  | BAR 0400 SW AGT        |
| Can be delayed for cover/inspections scheduled for 1000 04 Apr |                  |            |                        |
| Loch Maree 580' (TM) 19' 3"                                    | JAPAN            | (AST P-1W) | BAR 0400 SW            |
| Pacific Escort & P. J. Brix (FM) to assist                     |                  |            |                        |
| ATB Ocean Reliance 601' (CROW) 21' 0"                          | FERNDAL          | (PT. WEST) | BAR 1300 SW AGT        |
| Vishva Ekta 623' (TM)  | SOUTH KOREA      | (RAINANC)  | BAR 1900 SW AGT        |
| <u>ATB Sound Reliance 599' (CROW)</u>                          | <u>ANACORTES</u> | (PHIL-LO)  | <u>BAR 2100 SW AGT</u> |
| Tiwai Point 590' (PACNW) 21' 2"                                | VANCOUVER (BC)   | (VAN 1)    | BAR 2200 SW AGT        |

**OUTBOUND**

|   |           |                |               |
|---|-----------|----------------|---------------|
| Coeship OL 575' (ACGI) 32' 10"                                  | WEY LOG A | A/W 1525 04th  | Verbeck       |
| Aliki P 623' (BLUE) 21' 4"                                      | SIMPT     | A/W 1600 04th  | Gill          |
| VOSCO Sunrise 623' (CAS) 42' 9"                                 | VAN ANC   | SET 2200 04th  | Hurn          |
| Tidal window before 0930 or after 1500 @ Astoria-Capt. Torjusen |           |                |               |
| Diamond Seas 738' (TM) 40' 5"                                   | KAL EX    | CALL 0300 05th | Sigfridson or |
| OK thru low water @ Astoria-Capt. Torjusen                      |           |                |               |
| Saga Belja-Flor 654' (ACGI) 27' 10"                             | VAN 8     | CALL 2100 05th | Bair          |

**INFORMATION**

|                                  |         |            |                  |
|----------------------------------|---------|------------|------------------|
| Copacabana 583' (TM) 21' 0"      | AST ANC | (LGV ANC)  | TENT 1300 05th   |
| Modi Valencia 623' (TM) 20' 4"   | AST ANC | (AWAITING) | ORDERS 2359 05th |
| Giovanna 590' (BLUE) 22' 4"      | AST ANC | (AWAITING) | ORDERS 2359 05th |
| Crystal Wind 738' (BLUE) 22' 11" | AST ANC | (AWAITING) | ORDERS 2359 05th |
| Ultra Vanscoy 591' (WILH) 20' 8" | AST ANC | (AWAITING) | ORDERS 2359 05th |

PILOTS ON DUTY: 1. Torjusen 2. Jordan 3. Matteo 4. Nehring 5. Tierney 6. Farrell (S/B)  
PILOTS OUT:

NOTES: Bar status is Green ~ River level at Vancouver is 9.7  
NOAA water level is .1' higher than the Loadmax forecast.

\*Ships underlined and italicized are not approved by USCG for entry\*

Helo operational: Days=Beaudoin/Bruhn~ Nights=Wilkowski/Firth/O'Donnell~ Twilight=2017 & 0618

Two boats operational: Days=Chris & Jacob~ Nights=Frank & Corky~ Duty boat=Columbia





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## Results for Vessel: *NORTHERN VIGOUR*

### Vessel Information:

Vessel Name: NORTHERN VIGOUR  
VIN: 9304708  
Hull Number:  
Vessel Flag: GERMANY  
Vessel Call Sign: DCPQ2  
Build Year: 2005

### Vessel Particulars:

Service: Freight Ship  
Length: 727.1 ft  
Breadth:  
Depth:  
Alternate VINs:  
IMO Number: 9304708

### Service Information:

Service: In Service  
Out Of Service Date: N/A  
Last Removed From Service By: N/A

### Tonnage Information:

Deadweight:  
Gross Tonnage(GRT): 27437  
Net Tonnage(NRT): 13574  
Gross Tonnage(GT ITC):  
Cargo Authority:

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### Vessel Documents and Certifications

| Document   | Agency | Date Issued        | Expiration Date  |
|--|--------|--------------------|------------------|
| SOLAS Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate      | GL     | April 4, 2013      | October 31, 2013 |
| Minimum Safe Manning Document                      | DE     | March 6, 2012      | August 31, 2015  |
| ISM - Safety Management Certificate                | GL     | December 1, 2010   | August 31, 2015  |
| ISM - Document Of Compliance                       | GL     | September 29, 2010 | August 31, 2015  |
| International Load Line Certificate                | GL     | September 28, 2010 | August 31, 2015  |
| International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate | GL     | September 23, 2010 | August 31, 2015  |
| SOLAS Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate          | GL     | September 10, 2010 | August 31, 2015  |
| SOLAS Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate   | GL     | September 9, 2010  | August 31, 2015  |
| Classification Document                            | GL     | September 1, 2010  | August 31, 2015  |
| Tonnage Certificate, International                 | GL     | July 20, 2005      |                  |

### Summary of Coast Guard Contacts

|                                       |              |                                       |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|
| View Data From (MM/DD/YYYY): 4/7/2009 | To: 4/7/2014 | <input type="button" value="Submit"/> |
| <a href="#">Back to Top</a>           |              |                                       |

| #YY | MM | DD | hh | mm | WDIR | WSPD | GST | WVHT | DPD | APD | MWD  | PRES | ATMP | WTMP | DEWP | VIS | PTDY | TIDE |
|-----|----|----|----|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|
| #yr | mo | dy | hr | mn | degT | m/s  | m/s | m    | sec | sec | degT | hPa  | degC | degC | degC | nmi | hPa  | ft   |

|      |    |    |    |    |     |      |      |     |    |     |     |        |      |      |     |    |      |    |
|------|----|----|----|----|-----|------|------|-----|----|-----|-----|--------|------|------|-----|----|------|----|
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 12 | 50 | 220 | 5.0  | 6.0  | 1.9 | 14 | 7.0 | 270 | 1014.8 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 9.7 | MM | +0.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 11 | 50 | 230 | 5.0  | 6.0  | 2.2 | 14 | 7.5 | 277 | 1014.6 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 9.7 | MM | +0.4 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 10 | 50 | 190 | 5.0  | 7.0  | 2.1 | 13 | 7.1 | 283 | 1014.3 | 9.8  | 10.3 | 9.3 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 09 | 50 | 190 | 5.0  | 6.0  | 2.2 | 13 | 7.5 | 270 | 1014.2 | 10.2 | 10.3 | 9.4 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 08 | 50 | 200 | 4.0  | 5.0  | 2.1 | 14 | 7.1 | 286 | 1014.2 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 9.2 | MM | +0.3 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 07 | 50 | 220 | 6.0  | 8.0  | 2.3 | 13 | 7.1 | 294 | 1014.3 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 8.9 | MM | +0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 50 | 220 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.3 | 14 | 7.1 | 295 | 1014.0 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 9.0 | MM | +0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 05 | 50 | 210 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.5 | 14 | 6.9 | 275 | 1013.9 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 9.2 | MM | +0.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 04 | 50 | 190 | 8.0  | 9.0  | 2.5 | 14 | 6.5 | 279 | 1013.6 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 9.0 | MM | -0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 03 | 50 | 180 | 9.0  | 11.0 | 2.5 | 14 | 6.2 | 269 | 1013.3 | 9.8  | 10.5 | 8.3 | MM | -0.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 02 | 50 | 180 | 10.0 | 11.0 | 2.3 | 14 | 6.4 | 280 | 1013.3 | 9.4  | 10.4 | 8.0 | MM | -0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 01 | 50 | 190 | 9.0  | 11.0 | 2.6 | 14 | 7.2 | 273 | 1013.5 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 7.7 | MM | -1.1 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 05 | 00 | 50 | 180 | 7.0  | 8.0  | 2.5 | 14 | 7.3 | 276 | 1013.9 | 10.0 | 10.5 | 7.7 | MM | -0.8 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 23 | 50 | 190 | 9.0  | 11.0 | 2.5 | 15 | 8.0 | 293 | 1014.0 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 6.6 | MM | -0.8 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 22 | 50 | 180 | 6.0  | 8.0  | 2.4 | 15 | 7.8 | 281 | 1014.6 | 9.0  | 10.5 | 6.6 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 21 | 50 | 210 | 4.0  | 5.0  | 2.5 | 15 | 7.6 | 290 | 1014.7 | 8.9  | 10.5 | 6.6 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 20 | 50 | 200 | 5.0  | 6.0  | 2.8 | 15 | 8.2 | 285 | 1014.8 | 9.2  | 10.4 | 6.3 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 19 | 50 | 220 | 4.0  | 5.0  | 2.8 | 15 | 8.5 | 294 | 1014.8 | 9.4  | 10.4 | 7.0 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 18 | 50 | 200 | 6.0  | 8.0  | 2.7 | 15 | 8.8 | 293 | 1014.9 | 9.1  | 10.4 | 6.5 | MM | +0.3 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 17 | 50 | 190 | 3.0  | 4.0  | 2.9 | 15 | 8.7 | 290 | 1015.0 | 8.9  | 10.4 | 5.8 | MM | +0.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 16 | 50 | 200 | 4.0  | 5.0  | 2.7 | 16 | 8.3 | 295 | 1014.7 | 8.3  | 10.3 | 5.4 | MM | +0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 15 | 50 | 200 | 4.0  | 5.0  | 2.8 | 16 | 8.4 | 284 | 1014.6 | 9.3  | 10.3 | 5.7 | MM | +1.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 14 | 50 | 220 | 3.0  | 4.0  | 2.6 | 15 | 7.5 | 287 | 1014.4 | 8.9  | 10.3 | 5.0 | MM | +0.8 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 13 | 50 | 230 | 5.0  | 6.0  | 2.6 | 15 | 7.2 | 283 | 1014.0 | 9.0  | 10.3 | 5.2 | MM | +0.4 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 12 | 50 | 240 | 3.0  | 4.0  | 2.9 | 10 | 7.7 | 271 | 1013.6 | 8.8  | 10.3 | 4.0 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 11 | 50 | 240 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 3.0 | 10 | 7.9 | 266 | 1013.6 | 9.3  | 10.3 | 6.1 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 10 | 50 | 240 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.7 | 10 | 7.3 | 266 | 1013.6 | 9.3  | 10.3 | 6.0 | MM | -0.3 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 09 | 50 | 240 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.8 | 10 | 7.5 | 265 | 1013.6 | 9.4  | 10.3 | 6.2 | MM | -0.4 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 08 | 50 | 240 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.8 | 10 | 7.2 | 262 | 1013.8 | 9.5  | 10.3 | 6.2 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 07 | 50 | 230 | 6.0  | 8.0  | 2.8 | 11 | 7.3 | 265 | 1013.9 | 9.6  | 10.2 | 6.1 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 06 | 50 | 240 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.4 | 11 | 6.8 | 265 | 1014.0 | 9.7  | 10.2 | 6.2 | MM | +0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 05 | 50 | 230 | 6.0  | 8.0  | 2.3 | 11 | 6.6 | 259 | 1013.8 | 9.8  | 10.4 | 6.3 | MM | +0.9 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 04 | 50 | 240 | 5.0  | 6.0  | 2.4 | 8  | 6.8 | 217 | 1013.7 | 9.8  | 10.5 | 6.5 | MM | +1.1 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 03 | 50 | 240 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.2 | 8  | 6.3 | 205 | 1013.3 | 9.9  | 10.5 | 6.8 | MM | +1.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 02 | 50 | 250 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 2.3 | 8  | 6.2 | 234 | 1012.9 | 9.8  | 10.5 | 7.0 | MM | +1.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 01 | 50 | 250 | 7.0  | 8.0  | 2.4 | 8  | 6.2 | 228 | 1012.6 | 9.8  | 10.5 | 7.3 | MM | +0.9 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 04 | 00 | 50 | 250 | 7.0  | 8.0  | 2.3 | 8  | 6.0 | 244 | 1012.3 | 9.9  | 10.5 | 7.9 | MM | +0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 23 | 50 | 230 | 8.0  | 10.0 | 2.3 | 8  | 5.7 | 235 | 1011.9 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 8.2 | MM | +0.5 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 22 | 50 | 200 | 9.0  | 11.0 | 2.4 | 7  | 5.5 | 198 | 1011.7 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 8.6 | MM | +0.4 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 21 | 50 | 200 | 10.0 | 13.0 | 2.9 | 7  | 5.9 | 214 | 1011.6 | 9.9  | 10.4 | 8.6 | MM | +0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 20 | 50 | 190 | 12.0 | 14.0 | 2.9 | 8  | 5.7 | 217 | 1011.4 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 8.5 | MM | -0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 19 | 50 | 180 | 12.0 | 15.0 | 2.7 | 7  | 5.7 | 212 | 1011.3 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 8.5 | MM | -0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 18 | 50 | 170 | 15.0 | 18.0 | 2.8 | 7  | 5.5 | 200 | 1010.9 | 10.0 | 10.4 | 8.6 | MM | -0.8 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 17 | 50 | 170 | 13.0 | 16.0 | 2.5 | 6  | 5.2 | 197 | 1011.3 | 9.9  | 10.4 | 8.4 | MM | -0.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 16 | 50 | 170 | 13.0 | 16.0 | 2.1 | 6  | 4.8 | 208 | 1011.2 | 9.9  | 10.4 | 8.6 | MM | -1.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 15 | 50 | 170 | 12.0 | 15.0 | 2.1 | 5  | 4.8 | 192 | 1011.7 | 10.3 | 10.4 | 8.5 | MM | -1.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 14 | 50 | 170 | 12.0 | 14.0 | 1.9 | 5  | 4.6 | 193 | 1011.9 | 10.4 | 10.5 | 8.6 | MM | -1.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 13 | 50 | 170 | 11.0 | 13.0 | 1.6 | 5  | 4.6 | 179 | 1012.2 | 10.3 | 10.5 | 8.5 | MM | -1.1 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 12 | 50 | 170 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 1.5 | 5  | 4.4 | 192 | 1012.7 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 8.4 | MM | -1.2 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 11 | 50 | 170 | 10.0 | 13.0 | 1.5 | 9  | 4.6 | 270 | 1012.9 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 8.3 | MM | -1.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 10 | 50 | 170 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 1.3 | 8  | 4.5 | 271 | 1013.3 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 8.0 | MM | -1.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 09 | 50 | 170 | 9.0  | 11.0 | 1.4 | 10 | 4.8 | 286 | 1013.9 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 7.8 | MM | -1.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 08 | 50 | 170 | 9.0  | 10.0 | 1.4 | 9  | 5.2 | 263 | 1014.5 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 7.4 | MM | -1.6 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 07 | 50 | 180 | 7.0  | 8.0  | 1.4 | 9  | 5.5 | 276 | 1015.0 | 10.0 | 10.4 | 7.4 | MM | -1.4 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 06 | 50 | 180 | 6.0  | 8.0  | 1.4 | 9  | 5.7 | 279 | 1015.5 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 7.5 | MM | -0.9 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 05 | 50 | 190 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 1.5 | 9  | 5.9 | 270 | 1016.1 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 7.6 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 04 | 50 | 190 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 1.6 | 9  | 6.0 | 271 | 1016.4 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 7.4 | MM | +0.0 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 03 | 50 | 190 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 1.5 | 10 | 6.0 | 280 | 1016.4 | 10.1 | 10.6 | 6.8 | MM | -0.3 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 02 | 50 | 190 | 5.0  | 6.0  | 1.4 | 10 | 5.8 | 269 | 1016.3 | 10.0 | 10.7 | 6.1 | MM | -0.8 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 01 | 50 | 200 | 6.0  | 8.0  | 1.6 | 10 | 6.2 | 276 | 1016.5 | 10.2 | 10.7 | 6.2 | MM | -0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 03 | 00 | 50 | 200 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 1.5 | 10 | 6.0 | 281 | 1016.7 | 10.4 | 10.6 | 6.0 | MM | -0.7 | MM |
| 2014 | 04 | 02 | 23 | 50 | 210 | 6.0  | 7.0  | 1.4 | 11 | 6.0 | 264 | 1017.1 | 10.2 | 10.6 | 6.3 | MM | -0.3 | MM |



# OREGON BOARD OF MARITIME PILOTS

State Office Building  
Portland, Oregon 97232

Telephone:  
Fax:

Email:

## REPORT OF MARINE INCIDENT

|   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
|---|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|--|---|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|---|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|--|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Name of Vessel or Facility<br>Northern Vigour  |   | 2. Nationality<br>Germany   | 3. Type<br>(Towing, Freight, Fish, Drill, etc.)<br>Freight  | 4. Length 727 feet<br>5. Breadth 98 feet   |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| 6. Gross Tons<br>27,432   | 7. Year Built<br>2005   | 8. Propulsion<br>(Steam, diesel, gas, turbine...)<br>Diesel   | 9. H.P.   | 10. Draft<br>Fr. - Fwd In. - Aft<br>33-10  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| 11. Location (Berth, or range and bearing to nearest fixed aid to navigation or land mark. Include largest scale chart.)<br>8 miles NW of the CR Buoy   |   |   | 12. Date (if occurrence)<br>April 4, 2014   | 13. Time (local)<br>2300   |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| 14. Name, Address & Telephone Number of Operating Company (Agent)<br>Norton Lilly<br>[REDACTED]   |   |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| 15. Name of Master or Person in Charge  |   |   | 16. Name of Pilot Dan Jordan  |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| Telephone #   | Nationality of Master's License   |   | Telephone # 503-338-8599  | State License Number - 139<br>Federal License Number -<br>438788   |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| 17. Casualty Elements<br><table border="0"><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Hazardous Material Released or Involved</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Foundering or Sinking</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Steering Failure</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Oil Spill-Estimated Amount _____</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Heavy Weather Damage</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Machinery or Equipment Failure</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Grounding</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Fire</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Electrical Failure</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Flooding: Swamping Without Sinking</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Explosion</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Structural Failure</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Capsizing</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Damage to Aids to Navigation</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Wake Damage</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Collision</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Damage to Dock</td><td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Injury</td></tr><tr><td></td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Cargo Damage</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Loss of Life</td></tr></table> |   |   |   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> Hazardous Material Released or Involved   | <input type="checkbox"/> Foundering or Sinking  | <input type="checkbox"/> Steering Failure   | <input type="checkbox"/> Oil Spill-Estimated Amount _____   | <input type="checkbox"/> Heavy Weather Damage  | <input type="checkbox"/> Machinery or Equipment Failure | <input type="checkbox"/> Grounding | <input type="checkbox"/> Fire | <input type="checkbox"/> Electrical Failure | <input type="checkbox"/> Flooding: Swamping Without Sinking | <input type="checkbox"/> Explosion | <input type="checkbox"/> Structural Failure | <input type="checkbox"/> Capsizing | <input type="checkbox"/> Damage to Aids to Navigation | <input type="checkbox"/> Wake Damage | <input type="checkbox"/> Collision | <input type="checkbox"/> Damage to Dock | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Injury |  | <input type="checkbox"/> Cargo Damage | <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of Life |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hazardous Material Released or Involved  | <input type="checkbox"/> Foundering or Sinking  | <input type="checkbox"/> Steering Failure   |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Oil Spill-Estimated Amount _____   | <input type="checkbox"/> Heavy Weather Damage   | <input type="checkbox"/> Machinery or Equipment Failure   |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grounding  | <input type="checkbox"/> Fire   | <input type="checkbox"/> Electrical Failure   |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flooding: Swamping Without Sinking   | <input type="checkbox"/> Explosion  | <input type="checkbox"/> Structural Failure   |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Capsizing  | <input type="checkbox"/> Damage to Aids to Navigation   | <input type="checkbox"/> Wake Damage  |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Collision  | <input type="checkbox"/> Damage to Dock   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Injury  |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
|   | <input type="checkbox"/> Cargo Damage   | <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of Life   |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| 18. Conditions<br><table border="0"><tr><td>A. Sea or River Conditions<br/>(wave height, river stage, etc.)</td><td>B. Weather<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Clear<br/><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rain<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Snow<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Fog<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)<br/><input type="checkbox"/> _____</td><td>C. Time<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Daylight<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Twilight<br/><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Night</td><td>D. Visibility<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Good<br/><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fair<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Poor</td><td>E. Distance (miles) @ 5 MILES<br/>(of visibility)<br/>F. Air Temperature _____<br/>G. Wind Speed 15 kts<br/>&amp; Direction SSW<br/>H. Current Speed _____<br/>&amp; Direction _____<br/>I. Relevant Sounding Charts with Vessel Location _____<br/>J. Soundings Taken (Groundings Only) _____</td></tr></table>   |   |   |   |  | A. Sea or River Conditions<br>(wave height, river stage, etc.)   | B. Weather<br><input type="checkbox"/> Clear<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rain<br><input type="checkbox"/> Snow<br><input type="checkbox"/> Fog<br><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)<br><input type="checkbox"/> _____ | C. Time<br><input type="checkbox"/> Daylight<br><input type="checkbox"/> Twilight<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Night  | D. Visibility<br><input type="checkbox"/> Good<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fair<br><input type="checkbox"/> Poor | E. Distance (miles) @ 5 MILES<br>(of visibility)<br>F. Air Temperature _____<br>G. Wind Speed 15 kts<br>& Direction SSW<br>H. Current Speed _____<br>& Direction _____<br>I. Relevant Sounding Charts with Vessel Location _____<br>J. Soundings Taken (Groundings Only) _____ |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| A. Sea or River Conditions<br>(wave height, river stage, etc.)  | B. Weather<br><input type="checkbox"/> Clear<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rain<br><input type="checkbox"/> Snow<br><input type="checkbox"/> Fog<br><input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)<br><input type="checkbox"/> _____ | C. Time<br><input type="checkbox"/> Daylight<br><input type="checkbox"/> Twilight<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Night  | D. Visibility<br><input type="checkbox"/> Good<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fair<br><input type="checkbox"/> Poor | E. Distance (miles) @ 5 MILES<br>(of visibility)<br>F. Air Temperature _____<br>G. Wind Speed 15 kts<br>& Direction SSW<br>H. Current Speed _____<br>& Direction _____<br>I. Relevant Sounding Charts with Vessel Location _____<br>J. Soundings Taken (Groundings Only) _____ |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| 19. Navigation Information<br><table border="0"><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Moored Docked or Fixed<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Anchored <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Underway or Drifting<br/>Time of First Line _____<br/>Time of Last Line _____</td><td>OR<br/>Speed 17 kts<br/>Course 150<br/>Standby _____<br/>FWE</td><td colspan="2">X Inbound Time Transit Began 2318<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Outbound Time Transit Began <input type="checkbox"/> Shifting From<br/><input type="checkbox"/> Berthing/Unberthing _____ to _____</td></tr></table>  |   |   |   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> Moored Docked or Fixed<br><input type="checkbox"/> Anchored <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Underway or Drifting<br>Time of First Line _____<br>Time of Last Line _____ | OR<br>Speed 17 kts<br>Course 150<br>Standby _____<br>FWE  | X Inbound Time Transit Began 2318<br><input type="checkbox"/> Outbound Time Transit Began <input type="checkbox"/> Shifting From<br><input type="checkbox"/> Berthing/Unberthing _____ to _____ |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Moored Docked or Fixed<br><input type="checkbox"/> Anchored <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Underway or Drifting<br>Time of First Line _____<br>Time of Last Line _____  | OR<br>Speed 17 kts<br>Course 150<br>Standby _____<br>FWE  | X Inbound Time Transit Began 2318<br><input type="checkbox"/> Outbound Time Transit Began <input type="checkbox"/> Shifting From<br><input type="checkbox"/> Berthing/Unberthing _____ to _____ |   |  |  |   |   |   |  |   |                                    |                               |   |   |                                    |   |                                    |   |                                      |                                    |   |  |  |                                       |                                       |

USE REVERSE SIDE TO DESCRIBE INCIDENT



20. Describe Incident:

Date: April 7, 2014

The incident occurred while boarding the inbound containership Northern Vigour by helicopter at sea.

Most of the deck was filled with containers stacked two high, so we chose the only workable location to hoist me to a clear hatch. This was the starboard side of #2 hatch. The hoist went well and I landed standing on the hatch. When I was unhooking the hoist wire from my harness the wire became tight and jerked me up and backwards towards the containers on #3 hatch. Within seconds, the hoist operator severed the hoist wire dropping me to the hatch before hitting the containers. This all happened extremely quick and I credit the experience and professionalism of the hoist operator, Frank O'Donnel in preventing an outcome that could have turned out much worse. As it was, I found myself face down and bruised among the unused container lashings on the aft side of hatch #2. I'm not sure how long I laid there regaining my composure, but I eventually called the helicopter on my handheld radio and told them that I was bruised and hurt my shoulder, but was otherwise OK (I don't remember the exact verbage). I was able to climb off the hatch, walk to the bridge unassisted up 7 flights of stairs and pilot the ship.

While piloting the ship, I realized that I couldn't disembark in by pilot ladder in Astoria and rode the ship to Portland. I would like to thank the river pilot, Al Sheridan, for relieving me in Youngs bay and assisting me disembarking at Terminal 6. My wife met me at Terminal 6 and drove me to the hospital where I learned that I had a comminuted fracture of my right scapula. My helmet shows signs of hitting the ship, but luckily I have no head injury.



Pilot

Date received by Board: 4/7/14

Investigators:

Robert Johnson  
Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots

\_\_\_\_\_  
Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots

\_\_\_\_\_  
Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots

Disposition \_\_\_\_\_ Filed \_\_\_\_\_ Other (Describe Below)

See OAR 856-010-0020 Incident Report; Duty to Report for reporting requirements.

## Statement of Facts

|                          |  |                         |        |
|--------------------------|--|-------------------------|--------|
| <b>Vessels Name:</b>     | Northern Vigour                                | <b>Flag:</b>            | German |
| <b>Port of Registry:</b> | Hamburg  | <b>Call Sign:</b>       | DCPQ2  |
| <b>IMO Number:</b>       | ██████████                                     | <b>Official Number:</b> | 20447  |
| <b>Masters Name:</b>     | Capt. Gabriel Bondoc                           |                         |        |
| <b>Managing Owners:</b>  | Norddeutsche Reederei H. Schuldt GmbH & Co. KG |                         |        |

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <b>Kind of causality / accident</b>                   | Pilot injured due to fall on deck dropped by helicopter     |
| <b><u>In port</u> / at Sea / at Anchorage / River</b> | at Sea, off Columbia river bar, bound for Portland, OR, USA |
| <b>Date</b>   | 4 <sup>th</sup> April 2014 lt (- 7 hrs UTC)                 |

Date / Time LT (-0700 hrs UTC)  
4<sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 2250 lt

- 30 mins notice to E/R,
- contacted 'Columbia River Pilot' on VHF Ch. 09, reporting ship's arrival at 15 NM from the 'CR' buoy.
- received VHF info that sea pilot will board by helicopter.

4<sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / approx 2310 lt

the pilot of the helicopter 'Sea Hawk' instructed us on VHF Ch. 09 to maintain Co.150 deg.True, with the actual speed of abt. 17-18 knts, to switch on lights on deck, to stop transmission of both radars, and no crew on deck, all well away sheltered from the deck for lowering the sea pilot by winching down from the helicopter.

4<sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 2318 lt

- GPS pos. 46deg.15.3' N, 124 deg.18.0' W,
- True/Gyro Co.=150 deg., SMG approx 17 Knts,
- Winds = S-ly 5 Beaufort, Sea = 4 Beaufort,
- air temp.= +10 deg.C, Sea temp. = +11 deg.C,
- good visibility
- vessel pitching easily.
- the helicopter winched down the sea pilot on the Bay. No. 06, Stbd. Side hatch cover, as observed from the Bridge. Pilot on board.
- none of the crew was on deck to witness the operation, attending deck crew being sheltered under accommodation wings aft.
- few minutes later the 3<sup>rd</sup> Off. reported on Walkie Talkie that the sea pilot is feeling pain within his shoulder.

4<sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 2330 lt

- E.O.S.P. GPS pos. 46deg.12.8' N, 124 deg.15.9' W
- the sea pilot arrived on the Bridge, and said that during he was disconnecting the hook of the winch-line the helicopter jerked hoisting him again to a short height above the deck, and after that dropped him on the hatch cover, releasing the winch line from the

## Statement of Facts

|  |   |
|--|---|
|  | <p>helicopter at the same time to not pull him over-board. He said that during the fall he hit his right shoulder, which is painful now, supposing that his shoulder went dislocated.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- have asked him if able to perform his job to safely pilot the vessel in, and he said that he is able, but he won't be able to disembark by climbing the pilot ladder, deciding to remain on board till berthing at Portland, in order to go off by ship's gangway.</li><li>- he has announced the pilot station on his VHF, and cellular phone accordingly</li><li>- have also asked him if he would like some medicines for the pain, but he asked only for 'Ibuprofen' which we have not in stock. He said that we will discuss later on, after piloting the vessel in.</li></ul> |
| 5 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0045 lt      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- off Astoria, river pilot embarked by pilot boat, and relieved the sea pilot.</li><li>- the sea pilot was accommodated within the Owners cabin to be closer to the stairs, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Langemak Lars attended him by bandaging his right arm to prevent movements, and gave him some medicines.</li></ul>   |
| 5 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0700 lt      | The sea pilot came alone on the bridge for some coffee, and said that his wife is awaiting for him at Portland to go to a Doctor.   |
| 5 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0736 lt      | F. L. A. at Portland, Stbd. Side alongside berth no. 06.  |
| 5 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0754 lt      | All fast, F. W. E.  |
| 5 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0800 lt      | Both pilots disembarked by gangway.   |
| 5 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0805-0848 lt | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- vessel cleared by C. B. P., whilst the sea pilot accident was verbally reported to the boarding agent, who said that is neither ship's fault, nor her responsibility.</li></ul> <p>The accident was reported to the Superintendent.</p>   |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0337 lt      | River pilot on board for departure.   |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0400 lt      | All lines cast off, and departed from Portland, bound for Oakland.  |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0655 lt      | The pilot said that he got a phone call from his office that the sea pilot was found with a broken shoulder, and he will be declared unfit for 3 months.  |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0950 lt      | 1 sea pilot with 2 trainee pilots by pilot boat off Astoria,  |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0951 lt      | Lowered to the pilot boat the helicopter winching cable, according to the pilot station instructions.   |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 0955 lt      | river pilot disembarked by the same pilot boat.   |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 1057 lt      | 1 sea pilot with 2 trainee pilots disembarked by pilot boat.  |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> Apr..2014 / 1100 lt      | B. O. S. P. GPS pos: 46deg.11.8'N, 124deg.08.4'W, bound for Oakland.  |
| Capt. Gabriel Bondoc/Master              |   |



U.S. Navy,  
United States of America

WGS84

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

2940

